Tool · closed beta

Firmware Extractor

Reads the firmware straight off the device over SSH and hands it to the analysis. For devices in the field whose image you do not have as a file.

  1. 01$ lm-extract installInstall
  2. 02$ lm-extract loginSign in
  3. 03$ lm-extract pull --host <device-ip>Extract
Datasheet DB-EXT · lm-extract · Rev. BetaAs of 9 September 2026

Firmware Extractor

A command-line tool that reads the firmware of a running device over SSH and hands it to the analysis. For devices whose firmware is not available for download anywhere.

Status
Closed beta
Access
on request
Form
one static binary
Device access
SSH, read-only
01

Purpose

Many industrial routers, controllers and gateways only get their firmware at the factory. There is no download portal, or the portal requires a contract. The device itself has the firmware, in its flash. The Extractor reads it there, with the SSH access the administrator already has, and hands the image to the analysis.

The upload and the analysis stay as they are; the Extractor only fetches the file.

02

Commands

  1. 1

    $ lm-extract install

    Install. A single static binary you just run.

  2. 2

    $ lm-extract login

    Sign in. With your LegacyMind account. The token then sits in the operating system's keychain, never in plain text on disk.

  3. 3

    $ lm-extract pull --host <device-ip>

    Extract. Connects to the device over SSH, detects the flash partitions, reads them out and hands the image to the analysis.

For running without a terminal there is --json for machine-readable output, and an API token instead of the interactive sign-in. With these the call runs from cron or from a pipeline.

03

Process

  1. The administrator's computer connects to the device over SSH across the local network. Port 22, key from ~/.ssh. No inbound ports, no cloud routing.
  2. The tool detects the device's flash partitions and reads them out. It writes nothing to the device and installs nothing.
  3. The image goes encrypted into the LegacyMind workspace. The local copy sits in a temporary directory and is deleted after the upload; --keep keeps it.
  4. The analysis starts without a second step. The result appears in the platform's device overview, as with an uploaded image.
04

Specifications

Name
lm-extract
Status
Closed beta
Form
a single static binary, no runtime dependencies
Operating systems
Linux (amd64, arm64) · macOS (Intel, Apple Silicon) · Windows (amd64)
Device access
SSH over the local network, port 22, key authentication, read-only
Credentials
Token in the operating system's keychain: macOS Keychain, Linux Secret Service or KWallet, Windows Credential Manager. SSH keys from ~/.ssh.
Outbound traffic
only the sign-in to LegacyMind and the upload of the image
Local copy
temporary, deleted after upload; --keep keeps it
Automation
--json, API token for headless operation, schedulable via cron
05

Device classes in the beta

Linux-based (OpenWrt, DD-WRT, Yocto)
SSH, image via dd or sysupgrade
Generic embedded Linux
SSH, image from /dev/mtdblock
06

Not part of the tool

  • Devices without SSH

    Without SSH access the tool reads nothing. The firmware file then goes through the upload into the same analysis.

  • Vendor-encrypted images

    An image the vendor has encrypted is not decrypted. The analysis reports that it could not read the content and claims nothing about it.

  • Changes to the device

    The Extractor only reads. Everything on the device stays as it was.

  • Network analysis

    The tool watches no traffic and inventories no network. It reads a file from a device whose address it knows.

07

What arrives in the platform

The image lands in the same device overview as an uploaded one. Below is a sample analysis from the platform: risk score, severities, actively exploited entries, exposed credentials and keys, prioritised actions with effort.

Example analysisDemo firmware OpenWrt x86-64 with known vulnerabilities
3KEV

Aktiv ausgenutzt

7 geprüfte Schwachstellen

3 davon aktiv ausgenutzt (CISA KEV) · analysiert am 09.10.2026

  • 1Kritisch
  • 4Hoch
  • 2Mittel

Geprüfter Auszug: jeder Befund gegen NVD, CISA KEV und die Build-Konfiguration von OpenWrt 21.02.7 bestätigt. Analyse 09.10.2026, Image-SHA-256 95b633a5…f625c1.

3
Aktiv ausgenutzt (KEV)
CISA-KEV-Katalog
1
Konto ohne Passwort
0
Schlüssel und Zertifikate
119
von 119 Paketen erkannt
Version exakt
Prioritäre Maßnahmen3
Example analysis from the platform
08

Security framework

  • Use only by authorised people in agreed maintenance windows.
  • Read-only SSH access with its own key. No agent, nothing stays on the device.
  • Manual firmware upload as an equivalent path where SSH access is not permitted.
  • Key handling and access log documented in the platform.
09

Beta access

The Extractor is handed out in guided trials. Tell us which device you want to read, with its device class and whether SSH is permitted on it. If the device is not in section 05, we say so beforehand.

  • As of 9 September 2026
  • Source: beta documentation of lm-extract in the platform
  • Status: closed beta, not generally available
  • Sample analysis: demo firmware OpenWrt x86-64

Access to the closed beta

The Firmware Extractor runs in guided trials. Tell us which device you want to read.